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The end of the Cold War and the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
brought, among other things, a deep transformation of borders in the Balkans. Some 
borders vanished or became ‘soft’ borders; others appeared, as in the former Yugoslavia. 
The border between Greece and Albania is a good illustration of those transformations. Up 
to 1991, it was rarely crossed by people and goods, and the diplomatic relations between 
the two countries were extremely limited. At that time however, a huge migratory 
movement appeared, from Albania towards Greece, while the relations between the two 
countries were intensifying, including discussions about two controversial issues: the 
territorial conflict upon Northern Epirus and, connected to it, the status and rights of the 
Greek minority in Albania. 
 
In this paper, I will look at the experience of local border populations and at their 
participation in the new border dynamics. The content is based on fieldwork conducted 
since 2001 in the [567] Albanian district of Gjirokastër. The argument is that while the 
international border is being crossed, and the national boundary between Greeks and 
Albanians is being negotiated by Albanian migrants who want to become Greek, local 
boundaries are being reinforced in the border area, leading to a fragmentation of local 
society. 
 
I will first present the main features of the border, as part of the history of the area. I 
will then turn to the meaning of the border by taking the example of a small group of 
villages, and to the way uses and practices associated with the border reveal lines of 
division inside local society. 
 
 
THE GREEK-ALBANIAN BORDER AND ITS IMPACT ON LOCAL POPULATIONS 
 
The border: a place of ambiguity 
 
The Greek-Albanian border shares with other Balkan borders a certain number of 
features that make it a place of ambiguity. Established in 1913, when the Albanian state was 
created, and when Greece took control over former Ottoman territories in Epirus, the 
borderline is imposed by the Great Powers and divides a region that had been crossed so 
far only by administrative boundaries. As such the borderline did not satisfy anyone, 
though the international commission that was in charge of marking it took several criteria 
into consideration, including that of mother tongue, which was supposed to distinguish 
Greek nationals from Albanian nationals. 
 
The making of the former imperial territory into national territories could not be 
satisfying however, since national identities were not extremely developed at the time 
outside some intellectual circles, and since those national identities were in competition 
with other principles of division deeply rooted in local society, such as, for instance, 
religious affiliation. Thus some inhabitants of the area, being asked by the international 
commission to whom they belonged, would answer, in Albanian, “we are Greek”, meaning 
in fact that they were Orthodox Christians. 
 
[568] In such conditions, after the border was established, both states worked at the 
“nationalization” of their border territories, either through the school network or by 
changing names of numerous places that had come to be perceived as foreign, and had to 
be replaced by “national” ones. 
 
The existence of national minorities on both sides of the border was an obstacle to 
this process. National minorities were seen as a threat to the national homogeneity in the 
borderland. On the Albanian side, there still exists a Greek minority – whose boundaries 
are a matter of discussion between the two states – located mainly in the districts of 
Gjirokastër and Sarandë. Generally speaking, from the Greek point of view, this minority 
tends to include all the Orthodox Christians of southern Albania, who are supposed to be 
of Greek national consciousness, even if most of them are Albanian speaking. From the 
Albanian point of view, the Greek minority consists only of Greek speakers of specific 
places traditionally recognized as Greek. It does not include the Albanian speaking 
Christians, nor the Greek speakers who leave their villages to settle outside the “minority 
zone”. 
 
On the Greek side, an Albanian speaking population, never recognized as a national 
minority, remained until the Second World War. Muslim in majority, those Albanian 
speakers were forced to leave Greece, first in the twenties and later at the end of the Italian 
and German occupation, in 1944. They are called Chams in Albanian and Tsamidhes in 
Greek. 
 
Due to the state of war between the two countries, starting with the Italian invasion 
of Greece from Albania, during the winter of 1940-41, the border became a place of danger 
and a place to be defended. Following the Second World War and the Greek civil war 
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(1949), at the end of which the two countries remained in opposite geopolitical camps, the 
border was closed and a restricted or forbidden border zone was created on both sides. 
Crossings became extremely rare. A first limited opening occurs in 1985, but it is only with 
the end of the dictatorship in Albania in 1991 that crossing [569] the border became 
possible again. This was the beginning of the migration of Albanian workers towards 
Greece, and of a new trade from Greece to Albania. 
 
The history of the border, presented here in its main geopolitical aspects, should not 
make us forget the ambiguity of the border, which is marked and defended as the sacred 
boundary of national territory, and at the same time perceived as unable to limit this 
national territory, since it leaves on the other side important parts of the national 
population. 1  For some people in Greece, the Albanian districts of Korçë and Gjirokastër 
form Northern Epirus, a Greek land still waiting for its liberation from Albanian 
occupation, while Albanian nationalist parties, together with a majority of people in 
Southern Albania, pretend that “the borders of Albania go as far as Arta and Preveza”, 
giving Chameri, the area inhabited by the Albanian speaking Chams until 1944, a very 
extensive definition. 
 
The border area has thus a specific importance in the representations of national 
territory. The ambiguity of the border, the issue of what it can or cannot separate, is often 
present in the relations between Greeks and Albanians, including on unexpected occasions. 
A man from Gjirokastër thus told me a story which happened to him in Greece in 1994. 
Having no news from his son, migrant in Greece, for several months, he decided to go and 
look for him. After one month of search, he was arrested by the police in Athens. His 
tourist visa was no longer valid. 
 
“I was not ill-treated,” he said, “but I was wondering why they arrested me: I am 
neither Black nor Arab, and I was doing nothing wrong. There was a map on the wall 
of the office, in the police station; the policeman asked me to show him on the map 
where the border was, according to me: in Arta or on the Shkumbin?” 
 
[570] By answering “Arta,” the name of a Greek town claimed by Albanian 
nationalists, the man was presenting himself as a nationalist, a defender of the Cham 
question, and was thus taking the risk of being classified with the less wanted Albanian 
visitors in Greece. By answering “Shkumbin,” the northern border of Northern Epirus 
claimed by Greeks, he had a chance of being classified as a member of the Greek minority 
in Albania, for whom it is possible to go and work in Greece. The answer he actually gave 
to the policeman – or says he actually gave – illustrates the use that can be made of the 
border ambiguity, of the fact that, whatever the state control on the border may be, the 
border is unable to separate what cannot be separated: 
 
                                                 
1 For a more extensive view of this history, see Winnifrith, Tom. J. 2002. Badlands - Borderlands. A History of 
Southern Albania / Northern Epirus. London, Duckworth. 
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“I told him,” he said, “that the Greek and the Albanian languages have 2,000 words 
in common. I told him that Northern Epirus exists, but it is neither Greek nor 
Albanian; Northern Epirus has been a multiethnic state.” 
 
According to him, this means that the question of the border is not a question of 
being Greek or Albanian, that it is artificial and imposed from above to a “multiethnic” 
reality in which all groups, including the Muslim – to which he himself belongs – should 
have the same rights. 
 
A first attitude vis-à-vis the border can thus be to minimize its importance and 
relevance, and to assert the existence of a trans-border community, distinct from the 
populations living in the rest of both countries. But at the same time this trans-border 
community is said to exist, it is recognized as a “multiethnic” community. And this is what 
I what to argue now: there is a double process on the Albanian side of the border (but also 
on the Greek side), towards a greater permeability of the state border, and towards a 
strengthening of boundaries between local communities. 
 
 
The international border and local communities 
 
This process can be observed not only in the representations, but also in the practices 
of the border; both reveal lines of division [571] inside local society. Two facts must be 
kept in mind: 1) the existence, in Albanian rural society, of a number of boundaries, which 
we can call ethnic boundaries, and which delimit local groups recognized on the basis of 
shared customs, reference to a common origin or endogamous marriage patterns; 2) the 
fact that the Greek state offers better opportunities – in terms of migration – to the 
members of the Greek minority in Albania. 
 
This is due to the fact that Greek law knows two categories of foreigners: the ones of 
Greek descent, called omogeneis, “of same origin,” and the absolute ones, or allogeneis, “of 
other origin.” Candidates to migration to Greece, although they are all Albanian citizens, 
must fall into one of these two categories when they apply for a visa. Members of the 
Greek minority, as omogeneis, are allowed longer residence and work permits in Greece. 
 
Due to the ambiguous definition of the Greek minority, and also to the fact that 
“Greek descent” does not have to be evidenced anymore, but self-declared, the local 
meaning of the category omogeneis is somehow flexible: it can be applied to individuals who 
are not officially members of the Greek minority or who consider themselves to be 
Albanian but, for the sake of crossing the border, claim a Greek descent or a Greek 
national consciousness. In local terms, this category is translated as “Northern Epirote.” 
 
This does not mean however that everyone can claim to be Northern Epirote or that 
local boundaries are fading away. A Muslim inhabitant of Labëri, for instance, even if he 
changes his first name for a Christian or Greek name, even if he manages to obtain forged 
documents stating that he is a member of the Greek minority, will always remain a Muslim 
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in the eyes of the “real” or “true” Christians, who are making fun of those “men with a 
moustache who are getting baptized.” Thus in a Christian village, a man – an Albanian 
married to a woman from the Greek minority whose sons are migrants in Greece –  
explains: 
 
[572] My sons have kept their Albanian nationality, even if their mother is Greek. 2  
They did not try to obtain the Greek nationality. The Labs [i.e., people from Labëri] 
are the ones who pretend to be what they are not, as if they were Christians, they are 
getting baptized; do you realise? Men with a moustache who are getting baptized! We, 
Albanians from the borderland, the Greeks consider us closer to them, because we 
are Orthodox. We don’t have to cheat. 
 
What we see from this example is the importance, for members of the various local 
groups, to be situated in terms of distance and proximity from the border, from Greece 
and from the Greek minority. There is an implicit hierarchy in all this: the most privileged 
are the Greeks from Albania, members of the minority; in second position are the 
Aromanians, who are for most of them originating from the Greek side of the border and 
thus recognized as omogeneis, even if, when in Albania, they claim a specific Aromanian 
identity. The Albanian speaking Orthodox, as we have just seen, are considered close to the 
Greek minority, a closeness reinforced by mixed marriages, while the Muslims appear as 
the most distant from the category of omogeneis and, as such, can only manage by cheating. 
Among the Muslims, the Chams are the least welcome in Greece, owing to their real or 
imaginary claims on their former properties in Greece. 
 
To see more exactly what these groups are and what relations they have to the 
border, I will present briefly the case of a small region in the district of Gjirokastër, a group 
of a dozen of villages known under the name of Lunxhëri. Those villages are interesting 
because they are known since the beginning of the 19th century as inhabited by Albanian 
speaking Orthodox Christians, in opposition to the neighbouring areas of Kurvelesh, in 
Labëri, Muslim in majority, and of Dropull and Pogon, “traditional” Greek minority zone.3 
 
[573] During the communist period, the population of Lunxhëri changed to the point 
that the Lunxhots stricto sensu, Albanian speaking and Orthodox Christian, are not a 
majority anymore. Lots of them left the country at the beginning of the communist regime 
and used former migratory networks to settle in Greece and in America; others moved to 
the cities, and especially to Tirana. At the same time, Muslim families arrived from 
Kurvelesh and settled in Lunxhëri, where employment in the state farms offered them 
better conditions than the ones they had in their mountains. At the end of the fifties, the 
                                                 
2 There is a distinction in Albanian between citizenship (nënshtetësi), or being a citizen of a particular State, and 
nationality (kombësi), which is belonging to a nation. Members of the Greek minority in Albania are Albanian 
citizens of Greek nationality. 
3 For a more detailed presentation, see de Rapper, Gilles 2005. Better than Muslims, not as good as Greeks: 
emigration as experienced and imagined by the Albanian Christians of Lunxhëri, in The New Albanian 
Migration. King, Russell, Mai, Nicola and Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie (eds.) Brighton-Portland, Sussex 
Academic Press, pp. 173-194. 
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state decided that the semi-nomadic Aromanian shepherds should become sedentary 
shepherds and many of them chose to settle in the villages of Lunxhëri, which they already 
knew because they used to stop there on their way between winter and summer pastures, 
and where many empty houses were available. 
 
Today, the population of Lunxhëri is clearly perceived as consisting of three distinct 
groups, which do not intermarry: the Lunxhots, the Muslims and the Aromanians. In some 
cases, the three groups are also visible in the occupation of space, as in the village of 
Karjan, where the oldest part of the village, on the slope of a hill, is inhabited by Christians. 
The Muslims occupy the foot of the hill, while the Aromanians have settled on the side of 
the road leading to the village. 
 
[574] The relations between the three groups were not excellent during the 
communist period. From the Lunxhot point of view, both Muslims and Aromanians are 
invaders and they are responsible for the decline of Lunxhëri, which used to be a wealthy 
and well developed area at the time of the old migration, the kurbet. From the Christian 
point of view, Muslims are backward and violent mountaineers, while from the Albanian 
point of view, Christian and Muslim alike, Aromanians are stupid nomadic shepherds. Due 
to their origin on the other side of the border, they were also suspected of spying and 
complotting in favour of Greece. Many of them were sent to prison or persecuted on such 
accusations. 
 
What happened in the nineties, when migration to Greece started? Although the 
three groups were not official members of the Greek minority and as such have had more 
difficulties to cross the border legally, and although there has been occasionally 
cooperation between members of the three groups, altogether, migration only served to 
strengthen the feeling of separation and distinction between the three groups. 
 
The Aromanians were the first to leave, taking advantage of the fact that they had 
relatives in Greece, but also wanting to escape from racism and inferiority status in Albania. 
They were also the first ones to come back in Lunxhëri, bringing experience and some 
capital which they invested in trade, agriculture or construction work. 
 
The Lunxhots soon followed them, taking advantage of their previous experience of 
migration to Greece, before the Second World War, and also of their proximity, through 
religion, with Greece and the Greek minority. They seem however less willing to come 
back to Lunxhëri: they either stay in Greece or settle in cities on their return to Albania. 
Those who stayed in the villages are the poorest and those who did not succeed in Greece. 
They can only envy and regret the economical, political and often demographic domination 
of the Aromanians, who used to be the lowest group in local society, but have now become 
its most successful members. 
 
[575] Finally, the Muslims are the ones who have the most difficulties to migrate and 
to stay permanently in Greece. Contrary to the Aromanians and Lunxhots, their migration 
is not a family migration; it is largely illegal and their work conditions in Greece are 
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generally worse. They perceive themselves and are perceived in Lunxhëri as the laissés-pour-
compte of migration. 
 
To conclude, the argument can be summarized as follows: The border between 
Greece and Albania is an external border of the European Union, a place where border 
crossings and migration have to be controlled. Greece offers non-EU citizens a possibility 
to bypass migration regulation: to be recognized as Greeks from abroad, as foreigners of 
Greek origin. Given the local history of the border area, some Albanian citizens can apply 
for the status of “Greek origin” more easily than others. While the national boundary 
between Greeks and Albanians is being negotiated by Albanian migrants who want to 
become Greek, local boundaries are being reinforced in the border area, leading to a 
fragmentation of local society along pre-existing lines which take a new meaning in the 
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